

CURRICULUM VITAE
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PERSONAL

Born December 12, 1950, New York City
Married with 2 children

DEGREES

A.B. (Mathematics), Harvard University, 1972
A.M. (Applied Mathematics), Harvard University, 1974
Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics), Harvard University, 1976
M.A. (Honorary), Cambridge University, 1977
D.H.L. (Honorary), Bard College, 2008
Doctor Honoris Causa, Corvinus University of Budapest, 2008

FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS, AND AWARDS

National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1972-75
National Science Foundation Research Grants, 1977-
U.K. Economic and Social Science Research Council Grants, 1978-1995
Guggenheim Fellowship, 1980-81
Fellow, Econometric Society, elected 1981
Sloan Research Fellowship, 1983-85
Galbraith Teaching Prize, Harvard University, 1990, 1992
Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, elected 1994
Monash Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Monash University, 2003
Corresponding Fellow, British Academy, elected 2003
Fellow, European Economic Association, elected 2004
Honorary Professor, Wuhan University, 2004
Honorary Fellow, St. John's College, Cambridge, elected 2004
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, 2007

Kempe Award in Environmental Economics, 2007
Honorary Professor, Tsinghua University, 2007
EFR – Business Week Award, 2008
Honorary professor, State University-Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 2008
Member, National Academy of Sciences, elected 2008
Distinguished Fellow, House of Finance, University of Frankfurt, 2008
Honorary Professor, Shenzhen University, 2008
Grande Médaille of the City of Marseille, 2009

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

Research Fellow, Jesus College, Cambridge University, 1976-77
Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977-80
Associate Professor of Economics, M.I.T., 1980-81
Overseas Fellowship, Churchill College, Cambridge University, 1980-82
Professor of Economics, M.I.T., 1981-84
Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1985-2000
Visiting Overseas Fellowship, St. John's College, Cambridge, 1987-88
Louis Berkman Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1997-2000
Visiting Professor of Economics, M.I.T., 1999-2000
Visiting Lecturer in Economics with the Rank of Professor, Princeton University, 2000-
Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, 2000-

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES

American Economic Association
Nominating Committee 1995-6, 2008-9
Chair, Search Committee for Editor, *AEJ: Microeconomics*, 2006
Econometric Society
Fellow, elected 1981
Council, 1989-1995, 1999-2004
Executive Committee, 1993-1994, 2000-2004
Vice-President, 2001-2002
President, 2003
Chair, Officers Nominating Committee, 2006
Society for Social Choice and Welfare
Council 1995-2001
Game Theory Society
Charter Member
Council, 2001-2003
Executive Vice President, 2008-2010
President, 2010-2012

European Economic Association
Fellow, elected 2004
Global Economic Society
Founding Member

EDITORIAL POSITIONS

American Editor, *Review of Economic Studies*, 1977-82
Associate Editor, *Social Choice and Welfare*, 1983-2007
Advisory Editor, *Social Choice and Welfare*, 2007-
Editor, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1984-90
Advisory Editor, *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 1987-1994
Associate Editor, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 1988-
Editor, *Economics Letters*, 1992-
Associate Editor, *Review of Economic Design*, 1993-
Associate Editor, *QR Journal of Theoretical Economics*, 2000-
Associate Editor, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2001-2004
Editorial Advisor, *Journal of Developing Areas*, 2001-
Associate Editor, *International Journal of Game Theory*, 2003-2007
Advisory Editor, *International Journal of Game Theory*, 2007-
Advisory Editor, *Division of Labor and Transaction Costs*, 2005-
Advisory Editor, *Economics*, 2006-

JOURNAL ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS

1. "A Theorem on Utilitarianism," *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. XLVI (4), 1978, pp.93-96.
2. "Fonctions de Préférence Collective Définies sur des Domaines de Préférence Individuelle Soumis à des Contraintes," *Cahiers du Seminaire d'Econométrie*, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1979, pp.153-182.
3. "A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms," (with J.J. Laffont), in J.J. Laffont (ed.), *Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences*, North Holland, 1979, pp.289-308.
4. "Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium," in J.J. Laffont (ed.), *Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences*, North Holland, 1979, pp. 433-440.
5. "Decision-Making under Ignorance with Implications for Social Choice," *Theory and Decision*, 11, 1979, pp.319-337.
6. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," (with P. Dasgupta and P. Hammond), *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol.

- XLVI (2), 1979, pp.185-216.
7. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contracts, I: Steady States," (with P. Diamond), *Bell Journal of Economics*, 10, 1979, pp.282-316.
 8. "On the Difficulty of Attaining Distributional Goals with Imperfect Information," (with J. J. Laffont), *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 1979, pp.27-37.
 9. "Voting for Public Alternatives: Some Notes on Majority Rule," *National Tax Journal*, Vol. XXXII, 1979, pp.105-110.
 10. "Condorcet Proportions and Kelly's Conjectures," (with P. Fishburn and W. Gehrlein), *Discrete Applied Mathematics*, 1, 1979, pp.229-252.
 11. "Progress Report on Kelly's Majority Conjectures," (with P. Fishburn and W. Gehrlein), *Economics Letters*, 2, 1979, pp. 313-314.
 12. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," (with P. Dasgupta and P. Hammond), *Review of Economic Studies*, 1980, pp.857-860.
 13. "A Differentiable Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," (with J.J. Laffont), *Econometrica*, 48, 1980, pp.1507-1520.
 14. "On First-best Taxation," in J.R.C. Lecomber and M. Slater (eds.), *Income Distribution: The Limits to Redistribution*, Scientifica, 1980, pp.9-22.
 15. "Optimal Reservation Price in the Vickrey Auction," (with J.J. Laffont), *Economics Letters*, 6, 1980, pp.309-313.
 16. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, II: A Non-Steady Example," (with P. Diamond), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 1981, pp.165-195.
 17. "Nash and Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments," (with J.J. Laffont), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 1982, pp.17-47.
 18. "A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive-Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods," (with J.J. Laffont), *Review of Economic Studies*, 1983, 50, pp.171-196.
 19. "The Theory of Incentives: An Overview," (with J.J. Laffont), in W. Hildenbrand (ed.), *Advances in Economic Theory* (invited lectures from the 4th World Congress of the Econometric Society), Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp.31-94.
 20. "The Gains to Making Losers Pay in High Bid Auctions," (with J. Riley), in R. Englebrecht-Wiggans, M. Shubik, and R. Stark (eds.), *Auctions, Bidding, and*

- Contracting*, New York University Press, 1983, pp.205-230.
21. “Monopolistic Quantity Rationing,” (with V. Bohm, H. Polemarchakis, and A. Postlewaite), *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1983, 98, pp.189-198.
 22. “Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks,” (with O.Hart and S. Grossman), *Journal of Political Economy*, 1983, pp.907-926. Reprinted in S. Grossman, *The Informational Role of Prices*, MIT Press, 1989, pp.190-212.
 23. “A Second-Best Approach to Incentive Compatibility,” (with J.J. Laffont), in M. Boyer and R. Kihlstrom (eds.), *Bayesian Models in Economic Theory*, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1984, pp.143-154.
 24. “On the Efficiency of Fixed Price Equilibria,” (with J. Tirole), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 32, 1984, pp.317-327.
 25. “Optimal Auctions with Risk-Averse Buyers,” (with J. Riley), *Econometrica*, Vol. 52, No. 6, November 1984, pp.1473-1518. Reprinted in P. Klemperer (ed.), *The Economic Theory of Auctions*, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
 26. “Monopoly with Incomplete Information,” (with J. Riley), *Rand Journal of Economics*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1984, pp.171-196. Reprinted in G. Norman (ed.), *The Economics of Price Discrimination*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999; Also reprinted in M. Waldman and J. R. Johnson (eds.), *Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes*, vol. I, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007.
 27. “Auction Theory with Private Values,” (with J. Riley), *American Economic Review*, 75(2), 1985, pp.150-156, reprinted in P. Klemperer (ed.), *The Economic Theory of Auctions*, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
 28. “Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes,” (with J. Riley), *Journal of Public Economics*, 28(1), 1985, pp.1-23.
 29. “The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey,” in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein (eds.), *Social Goals And Social Organization: Volume in Memory of Elisha Pazner*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.173-204. Reprinted in A. Rubinstein (ed.), *Game Theory in Economics*, London: Edward Elgar, 1995.
 30. “The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, Part I (Theory),” (with P. Dasgupta), *Review of Economic Studies*, 53(1), 1986, pp.1-26. Reprinted in K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta (eds.), *Economic Organizations as Games*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp.48-82.
 31. “The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, Part II

- (Applications),” (with P. Dasgupta), *Review of Economic Studies*, 53(1), 1986, pp.27-41. Also reprinted in K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta (eds.), *Economic Organizations as Games*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp.83-102.
32. “An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria” (with R. Radner and R. Myerson), *Review of Economic Studies*, 53(1), 1986, pp. 59-69.
 33. “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information,” (with D. Fudenberg), *Econometrica*, 54(3), 1986, pp.533-554. Reprinted in A. Rubinstein (ed.), *Game Theory in Economics*, London: Edward Elgar, 1995. Also reprinted in D. Fudenberg and D. Levine, *Understanding Dynamic Games: Limits, Continuity, and Robustness*, World Scientific Publishers, forthcoming.
 34. “The Existence of Equilibrium with Price-Setting Firms,” *American Economic Review*, 76(2), 1986, pp.382-386.
 35. “Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms,” in W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett (eds.), *Uncertainty, Information and Communication*, Volume 3 (essays in honor of Kenneth Arrow), Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp.229-238.
 36. “On the Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods,” in G. Feiwel (ed.), *Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy* (essays in honor of Kenneth Arrow), MacMillan, 1987, pp. 341-349.
 37. “Monopoly with Asymmetric Information about Quality: Behavior and Regulation,” (with J.J. Laffont), *European Economic Review*, 31(1), 1987, pp.483-489.
 38. “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III: Cournot Competition,” (with J. Tirole), *European Economic Review*, 31(4), 1987, pp.947-968. “Corrigendum,” *European Economic Review*, 32(7), 1988, pp.1567-1568.
 39. “Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics,” (with J.J. Laffont and J.C. Rochet) in T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter (eds.), *Information, Incentives and Economic Mechanisms* (essays in honor of Leonid Hurwicz), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987, pp.256-266.
 40. “Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots,” (with J. Tirole), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 43(2), 1987, pp. 364-373.
 41. “The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios,” (with P. Dasgupta), *Economic Journal*, 97, 1987, pp.581-595.
 42. “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large

- Fixed Costs,” (with J. Tirole), *Econometrica*, 56(3), 1988, pp.549-570.
43. “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles,” (with J. Tirole), *Econometrica*, 56(3), 1988, pp.571-599. Reprinted in J. Gabszewicz and J.-F. Thisse (eds.), *Microeconomic Theories of Imperfect Competition: Old Problems and New Perspectives*, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
 44. “Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions,” (with J. Riley), in F. Hahn (ed.), *The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games*, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp.312-335. Reprinted in P. Klemperer, *The Economic Theory of Auctions*, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
 45. “Renegotiation in Repeated Games,” (with J. Farrell), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 1, 1989, pp.327-360. Reprinted in E. Maskin (ed.), *Recent Developments in Game Theory*, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp.388-421.
 46. “Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium: Reply,” (with J. Farrell), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 49(2), 1989, pp 376-378.
 47. “Efficient Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Games,” (with R. Evans), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 1, 1989, pp.361-369.
 48. “Rational Expectations with Imperfect Competition: A Bertrand-Edgeworth Example,” (with J.J. Laffont), *Economics Letters*, 30, 1989, pp.269-274.
 49. “Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency,” (with D. Newbery), *American Economic Review*, 80(1), 1990, pp.143-156.
 50. “The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market,” (with J.J. Laffont), *Journal of Political Economy*, 98(1), 1990, pp.70-93.
 51. “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values,” (with J. Tirole), *Econometrica*, 58(2), 1990, pp.379-409. Reprinted in J.J. Laffont (ed.), *The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives*, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
 52. “Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games,” (with D. Fudenberg), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 51, 1990, pp.194-206
 53. “Contract Renegotiation in Models of Asymmetric Information,” (with M. Dewatripont), *European Economic Review*, 34(2&3), 1990, pp.311-321.
 54. “Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games,” (with D. Fudenberg), *American*

- Economic Review*, 80(2), 1990, pp.274-279. Reprinted in E. Maskin (ed.), *Recent Developments in Game Theory*, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 339-344.
55. “Repeated Games with Long and Short-Run Players,” (with D. Fudenberg and D. Kreps), *Review of Economic Studies*, 57, 1990, pp.555-573.
 56. “On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games,” (with D. Fudenberg), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 53, 1991, pp.428-438.
 57. “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values,” (with J. Tirole), *Econometrica*, 60(1), 1992, pp.1-42.
 58. “Production Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy in an Economy with Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Shocks,” (with O. Hart) in P. Dasgupta, D. Gale, O. Hart and E. Maskin (eds.), *Economic Analysis of Markets and Games* (essays in honor of Frank Hahn), MIT Press, 1992, pp.107-127.
 59. “Auctions and Privatization,” in Horst Siebert (ed.) *Privatization*, J.C.B. Mohr Publisher, 1992, pp.115-136.
 60. “Centralization of Credit and Long-Term Investment,” (with M. Dewatripont) in P. Bardhan and J. Roemer (eds.) *Market Socialism: The Current Debate*, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.169-174.
 61. “The Invisible Hand and Externalities,” *American Economic Review*, 1994, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp.333-337. Reprinted in R. Tresch (ed.), *Public Sector Economies: Critical Concepts*, London: Routledge, forthcoming.
 62. “Conceptual Economic Theory,” in P. Klein (ed.), *The Role of Economic Theory*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp.187-195.
 63. “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,” (with D. Fudenberg and D. Levine), *Econometrica*, 62(5), 1994, pp.997-1039. Reprinted in E. Maskin (ed.), *Recent Developments in Game Theory*, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 345-387. Also reprinted in D. Fudenberg and D. Levine, *Understanding Dynamic Games: Limits, Continuity, and Robustness*, World Scientific Publishers, forthcoming.
 64. “Majority Rule, Social Welfare Functions, and Games Forms,” in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura (eds.), *Choice, Welfare, and Development* (essays in honor of Amartya Sen), Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.100-109.
 65. “Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules when the Designer does not Know Endowments or Production Sets,” (with L. Hurwicz and A. Postlewaite), in J. Ledyard (ed.), *The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and*

- Stability* (essays in honor of Stanley Reiter), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 367-433.
66. “Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies,” (with M. Dewatripont), *Review of Economic Studies*, 62, 1995, pp.541-555. Reprinted in S. Bhattacharya, A. Boot and A. Thakor (eds.), *Credit, Intermediation and the Macroeconomy Models and Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, 2004.
 67. “Long-Term Investment by Japanese and American Firms,” *Japan and the World Economy*, 7, 1995, pp.249-254.
 68. “Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation,” (with M. Dewatripont), *Rand Journal of Economics*, 1995, pp.704-719.
 69. “A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter,” (with A. Banerjee), *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. CXI, (4), 1996, pp.955-1605. Abridged version reprinted in Spanish as “Una Teoría Walrasiana de Dinero y Trueque,” *Gaceta de Economía*, 3(5), 1997, pp.5-15.
 70. “Theories of the Soft Budget Constraint,” *Japan and the World Economy*, 1996, pp. 125-133.
 71. “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 66, 1999, pp.23-38. Reprinted in J.J. Laffont (ed.), *The Principal Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives*, London: Edward Elgar, 2003.
 72. “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,” (with J. Tirole), *Review of Economic Studies*, 66, 1999, pp.83-114.
 73. “Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature,” (with J. Tirole), *Review of Economic Studies*, 66, 1999, pp.139-149.
 74. “Implementation and Renegotiation,” (with J. Moore), *Review of Economic Studies*, 66, 1999, pp.39-56.
 75. “Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint,” *American Economic Review*, 89, No. 2, 1999, pp.421-425.
 76. “Democracy and the Good,” (with P. Dasgupta), in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds.), *Rethinking Democracy for a New Century*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
 77. “Uncertainty and Entry Deterrence,” *Economic Theory*, 14, 1999, pp. 429-437.
 78. “Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments,” (with M. Chen),

- Journal of Economic Theory*, 89(1), November 1999, pp. 140-147.
79. "Introduction," in E. Maskin (ed.), *Recent Developments in Game Theory*, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp.ix-xviii.
 80. "Managing Ecosystem Resources" (with K. Arrow, G. Dailey, P. Dasgupta, S. Levin, K.-G. Maler, D. Starrett, T. Sterner, and T. Tietenberg), *Environmental Science and Technology*, 34, 2000, pp. 1401-1406.
 81. "Efficient Auctions," (with P. Dasgupta), *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. CXV, May 2000, 341-388.
 82. "Auctions, Development, and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity-Constrained Buyers" (text of the Marshall lecture to the European Economic Association), *European Economic Review*, Vol. 44 (4-6), May 2000, pp. 667-681.
 83. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," (with J. Riley), *Review of Economic Studies*, 67, 2000, pp. 439-454.
 84. "Asymmetric Auctions," (with J. Riley), *Review of Economic Studies*, 67, 2000, pp. 413-438. Reprinted in P. Klemperer (ed.), *The Economic Theory of Auctions*, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
 85. "Soft Budget Constraints and Transition," (with M. Dewatripont and G. Roland), in E. Maskin and A. Simonovits (eds.), *Planning, Shortage and Transformation* (essays in honor of Janos Kornai), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 143-156.
 86. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," (with Y. Qian and C. Xu), *Review of Economic Studies*, 67, 2000, pp. 359-378.
 87. "Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market" (with C. Xu), *Economics of Transition*, 9, 2001, pp. 1-27. Reprinted in E. Berglof and G. Roland (eds.), *The Economics of Transition: Proceedings of the 5th Nobel Symposium*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 12-36.
 88. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions," (with J. Tirole), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 100, 2001, pp.191-219.
 89. "Kinds of Theory," in T. Negishi, R. Ramachandran and K. Mino (eds.), *Economic Theory, Dynamics and Markets* (essays in honor of Ryuzo Sato), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, pp. 45-55.
 90. "Roy Radner and Incentive Theory," *Review of Economic Design*, 6, 2001, pp.311-324. Reprinted in T. Ichiishi and T. Marschak (eds.), *Markets, Games, and Organizations*

- (essays in honor of Roy Radner), Berlin: Springer, 2002, pp. 179-192.
91. "On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," *European Economic Review*, 46(4-5), 2002 pp. 725-733.
 92. "Implementation Theory," (with T. Sjöström), in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura (eds.), *Handbook of Social Choice Theory Vol. I*, Amsterdam: North Holland, 2002, pp. 237-288.
 93. "Auctions and Efficiency,"(text of the Seattle lecture), in M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky (eds.), *Advances in Economic Theory* (invited lectures from the 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society), Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 1-24.
 94. "Mechanism Design for the Environment," (with S. Baliga) in K.G. Mäler, and J. Vincent (eds.), *Handbook of Environmental Economics*, Elsevier Science/North Holland, Vol 1, June 2003, pp.306-324.
 95. "Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions," (with J. Riley), *Games and Economic Behavior* (issue in memory of Robert Rosenthal), 45, 2003, pp. 395-409.
 96. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," (with J. Kornai and G. Roland), *Journal of Economic Literature*, 41(4), 2003, pp. 1095-1136. Reprinted in Hungarian, *Közgazdasági Szemle*, 60, 2004, (7-8) pp. 608-624 and (9) pp. 777-809. Reprinted in Russian, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 11, 2004, pp. 4-33.
 97. "The Fairest Vote of All," (with P. Dasgupta), *Scientific American*, 290 (3), 2004, pp. 64-69.
 98. "Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2 (5), 2004, pp. 913-923.
 99. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," (with J. Tirole), *American Economic Review*, 94 (4), 2004, pp. 1034-1054. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, and K. Shepsle (eds.), *Rational Choice Politics*, London: Sage Publications, 2009.
 100. "The Unity of Auction Theory," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 42 (4), 2004, pp. 1102-1115.
 101. "Why Has Inequality Increased in China?" *Division of Labor and Transaction Costs*, 1 (1), 2005, pp.67-71.
 102. "Public Goods and Public Science," in K. Maskus and J. Reichman (eds.), *International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.139-141.

103. “Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting,” (with P. Dasgupta), *American Economic Review*, 95 (4), 2005, pp.1290-1299 (winner of the 2007 Kempe Award in Environmental Economics).
104. “On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules,” *Florida State University Law Review*, 33 (3), 2006, pp. 557-562.
105. “Bargaining and Destructive Power” (with P. Dasgupta), *Annals of Economics and Finance*, 8 (2), 2007, pp. 217-227.
106. “On the Fundamental Theorems of General Equilibrium” (with K. Roberts), *Economic Theory*, 35 (2), 2008, pp. 233-240.
107. “Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits” (with J. Tirole), *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 26 (2), 2008, pp. 412-420.
108. “Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals,” in *Les Prix Nobel 2007*, Nobel Foundation, 2008 (Nobel Lecture). Reprinted in *American Economic Review*, 98 (3), 2008, pp. 567-76. Also reprinted in Russian, *Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference on Economics*, Moscow, 2009.
109. “On the Robustness of Majority Rule” (with P. Dasgupta), *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6 (5), 2008, pp. 949-973.
110. “Can Neural Data Improve Economics?” *Science*, 321, 2008, pp.1788-1789.
111. “The Value of Victory: Social Origins of the Winner’s Curse in Common Value Auctions,” (with W. van den Bos, J. Li, T. Lau, J. Cohen, R. Montague, and S. McClure), *Judgment and Decision Making*, 3, 7, 2008, pp. 483-492.
112. “Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation,” (with J. Bessen), *Rand Journal of Economics* (forthcoming).
113. “Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games,” in S. Levin (ed.), *Games, Groups, and the Global Good*, Springer (forthcoming).
114. “Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design,” *Games and Economic Behavior* (forthcoming)

WORKING PAPERS

1. “On the Robustness of Unanimity Rule” (with P. Dasgupta).

2. “Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information” (with D. Fudenberg and D. Levine).
3. “Rational Expectations with Imperfect Competition, I: Monopoly” (with J.J. Laffont).
4. “Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form” (with Y. Qian and C. Xu).
5. “Evolution in Repeated Games” (with D. Fudenberg).
6. “Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill” (with M. Kremer).
8. “Multi-Good Efficient Auctions with Multidimensional Information” (with P. Eso).
9. “Is Majority Rule the Best Election Method?” Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science Occasional Paper, 11, 2001.
10. “Bargaining, Coalitions, and Externalities”
11. “Notes on Equilibrium Existence in Economies with Oligopolistic Firms,” in *General Equilibrium: 40th Anniversary Conference*, CORE discussion paper, 1994.
12. “Multi-unit Auctions, Price Discrimination and Bundling” (with J. Riley)

BOOKS EDITED

Economic Analysis of Markets and Games (with P. Dasgupta, D. Gale, and O. Hart), MIT Press, 1992.

Planning, Shortage, and Transformation (with A. Simonovits), MIT Press, 2000.

Recent Developments in Game Theory, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.

BOOK REVIEWS

Review of K. Binmore, *Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory*, in *Economic Journal*, 100(43), 1990, 1338-39.

Review of H. Moulin, *Axioms of Cooperative Decision-Making*, in *Journal of Economic Literature*, 29, 1991, 1750-51.

Review of R. Weintraub, *How Economics Became a Mathematical Science*, in *Journal of Economic Literature*, 42, (1), 2004, 173-174.

“Markets and Where They Come From,” Review of S. Bowles, *Microeconomics*, in *Science*, 306, (5700), 2004, pp.1293-1294.

OTHER ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

“Roemer on Inequality,” *Boston Review*, Volume XX, No. 2, April/May 1995.

“Should Software be Patented?,” text of the *Taesung Kim Lecture Series 6*, May 6, 2004 at Seoul National University.

“Reply to Michael Sandel,” *New York Times*, December 17, 1997. Reprinted in R. Stavins (ed.), *Economics of the Environment*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2005, p.357.

“Obituary: Leonid Hurwicz,” *The Guardian*, July 21, 2008, p.31.

“Advice to the New President,” *Newsweek*, October 22, 2008

NAMED LECTURES

Wellington-Burnham Lecture, Tufts University, December 1993

Churchill Lectures, Cambridge University, April 1994

Brussels Lecture in Managerial Economics, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, May 1994

Miller Lecture, Iowa State University, December 1996

Kenneth Arrow Lectures, Stanford University, April 1998

Alfred Marshall Lecture, European Economic Association, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, September 1999

Vilfredo Pareto Lecture, ASSET conference, Tel Aviv, October 1999

Seattle Lecture, World Congress of the Econometric Society, Seattle, August 2000

Lionel McKenzie Lecture, University of Rochester, April 2001

Nancy Schwartz Memorial Lecture, Northwestern University, May 2002

T.S. Kim Memorial Lecture, Seoul National University, May 2004

Toulouse Lectures, Toulouse, France, June 2004

Zeuthen Lectures, Copenhagen, November 2004

Arrow Lecture, Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Istanbul, July 2006

Jacob Marschak Lecture, South East Asian Meetings, Econometric Society, Chennai, India, December, 2006

Marshall Lectures, Cambridge University, March 2007

Pazner Memorial Lecture, University of Tel Aviv, May 2007

Lawrence Klein Lecture, University of Pennsylvania, May 2007

Kempe Award Lecture, Umea, Sweden, October 2007

Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture in Economics, Stockholm, December, 2007

G. Woody Thompson Lecture, Midwest Economics Association, March 2008

Sun Hung Kai Nobel Laureate Distinguished Lecture, Chinese University of Hong Kong,

April 2008

Max Weber Lecture, European University Institute, Florence, September 24, 2008

John F. Nash Lecture, Carroll Round, Georgetown University, April, 2009

Pareto Lecture, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin, June 2009

Bogen Lecture, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June 2009

McKenzie Lecture, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Ischia, July 2009

Hurwicz Lecture, Minneapolis, October 2009

Zvi Griliches Lectures, New Economic School, Moscow, Spring, 2010

OTHER MAJOR LECTURES (SELECTED)

Plenary Lecture, 6th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, Quebec, Canada, July 1994

Public Lecture, Center for Japan-U.S. Business and Economic Studies, Tokyo, November 1994

Plenary Lectures, International Conference on Game Theory, S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook, July 1994; July 1998; July 2002, July 2003, July 2005

Plenary Lecture, XIII Conference on Game Theory and Applications, Bologna, June 1999

Closing Address, 12th National Congress of Economics Students, Vera Cruz, Mexico, November 1999

Plenary Lecture, International Conference on Technological Policy and Innovation, Paris, November 2000

Plenary Lecture, International Symposium on Software Patents, Frankfurt, April 2001

Opening Plenary Lecture, South-East Economic Theory & International Economics Conference, Florida International University, November 2001

Keynote Address, Canadian Economic Theory Conference, Toronto, May 2002

Keynote Address, Society for Economic Design, New York, July 2002

Presidential Address, Econometric Society, Evanston, Sydney, Stockholm, and Panama City, June-August 2003

Invited Lecture, Far East Meetings, Econometric Society, Seoul, July 2004

Plenary Lecture, Second World Congress, Game Theory Society, Marseille, July 2004

Keynote Lecture, Workshop on Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints, Stony Brook, July 2004

Keynote Lecture, International Conference on Economic Growth in China, Beijing, February 2005

Public Lecture, Tsinghua University, Beijing, February, 2005

Keynote Lecture, Default Rules in Private and Public Law: A Symposium, Florida State University, March 2005

Keynote Lecture, Fourth International Conference on Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice, Université de Caen, June 2005

Plenary Address, Conference in Memory of Jean-Jacques Laffont, Toulouse, July 2005

Plenary Lecture, Far East Meetings, Econometric Society, Beijing, July, 2006

Plenary Lectures, Annual Academic Conference, School of Economics, Moscow State

University, April, 2007, 2009
Public Lecture, Tsinghua University, November 2007
Public Lecture, Wuhan University, November 2007
Public Lecture, University of Edinburgh, November 2007
Public Lecture, Delhi School of Economics, December, 2007
Keynote Lecture, Joint meeting of the Econometric Society and the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association, Rio de Janeiro, November, 2008
Keynote Lecture, Centenary Conference, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, December, 2009
Keynote Lecture, Gérard-Varet Conference in Public Economics, Marseille, June, 2009

PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE

Lectures on Repeated Games for Dutch Network of Economic Theorists, Utrecht, Netherlands, June 1991
Advisor to Polish government on design of auctions for privatization, 1991
Lectures on Implementation Theory, V. Rothschild Foundation Summer School in Economic Theory, Hebrew University, June 1993
Visiting Committee, Economics Department and Institute for Decision Sciences, State University of New York at Stony Brook, February 1995
Advisor to Bank of Italy on design of treasury note auctions, 1997
Lectures on Contract Theory, Winter School of the Econometric Society, Delhi, India, December 1999
Visiting Committee, Economics Department, Stanford University, 2000
Lectures on Auction Theory, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Fall, 2000
Advisor to J.S. Guggenheim Fellowship Committee, 2001-
MacArthur Foundation Fellowship Nominator, 2001-2002
Visiting Committee, Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000-
Lectures on Contract Theory, SET-VIU Summer School on Contract Theory, Venice, Italy, July 2001
Advisor to British government on design of auctions for greenhouse gas reduction, 2001-3
Lectures on Auction Theory, University of Pennsylvania, Fall 2000; Wuhan University, China, January 2004
Selection Jury, Francqui Prize, April 2004
Lectures on Cooperative Game Theory, Seoul National University and University of Tokyo, May 2004; Stockholm School of Economics, March 2005; Wuhan University, May 2005; University of Bolzano, July 2005; Gerzensee Studiezentrum, August 2005
Scientific Board, Center on Auctions, Procurement and Competition Policy, Pennsylvania State University, 2006-
Lectures on Mechanism Design/Implementation Theory, CEMA, Central University, Beijing, November 2006; National Taiwan University, Taipei January, 2007,

Shenzhen University, November 2008.
Lectures on Implementation Theory, CEMA, Beijing, November 2007; Delhi School of Economics, December 2007.
Scientific Council, J.J. Laffont Foundation, Toulouse School of Economics, 2007-
Education Advisory Board, J.S. Guggenheim Foundation, 2007-
Affiliated Member, Center for Game Theory, SUNY at Stony Brook, 2007-
Trustee, Economists for Peace and Security, 2007-
Director, Summer School in Economic Theory, Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2008-
Consultant to the World Bank on the Advance Market Commitment program, 2008
Sponsor, Federation of American Scientists, 2008-
Panel on Grant Evaluation, European Research Council, 2008, 2010
Science Board, Santa Fe Institute, 2008-11
Academic Committee, Center for Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2009-
Member, Sertel Center for Economic Studies, Bilgi University, 2009-
Scientific Council, Solvay School of Economics, Free University of Brussels, 2009-
Jury, Rey Jaime I Prize, 2009

OTHER PUBLIC SERVICE

Scientific Advisory Board, Lifeboat Foundation, 2008-
Advisory Council, J Street, 2008-
National Committee for Israel's 60th Anniversary, 2008
Board of Directors, High Spirit Community Farm, 2008-
National Co-Chair, Beaver Farm Capital Campaign, 2008-
Board of Trustees, Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, 2008-2011
Board of Directors, Camphill Foundation, 2008-2011
Correspondent, Committee on Human Rights, National Academy of Sciences, 2009-